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Before the tragedy of September 11, 2001 ― before that traumatic welcome to the
new millennium, before the collapse of the“dot-com”financial markets bubble, and
before the interrogated election results of 2000, the impeachment of President Clinton
on the grounds that he had perjured himself while giving testimony under oath before
a grand jury served to highlight a discussion on our“postmodern”condition and the
problem of a supposed relativization of truth.  This study is yet another commentary
on the question of certainty, particularly as posed by the French philosopher Jacques
Derrida and his American contemporary Stanley Cavell.  It will be shown how both
philosophers leave us with the possibility of  responding positively within the doubts
posed by skepticism and postmodernism.
Over the course of the last decade,“postmodernism”has filtered the very air of
our national discourse.  Perhaps I was not alone in the 1990s in speculating that
President Clinton might be described as America’s first postmodern president in that
he was our first leader who acknowledged and used (overtly) some of the premises
associated with deconstruction.  President Clinton’s now-famous sentence“It depends
on what the meaning of‘is’is,”elicited a response from the Republican investigator
David Schippers that is reminiscent of postmodern theory’s more virulent detractors.
Mr. Schippers’summation before the House Judiciary Committee (December 10, 1998)
included these assertions: 
That single declaration, ... points out his attitude and his conscious indifference
and complete disregard for the concept of truth. ... He also invites --invents
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convoluted words or phrases in his own crafty mind. ... You would never know
his secret mental reservations or the unspoken redefinition of words.  And
even if you thought you’d solved the enigma, it wouldn’t matter; he’d just
change the meaning to suit his purpose.1
I quote Mr. Schippers at length because his words so powerfully engage the
debate regarding postmodernism’s arbitrary relativization of truth.  Here is how the
American philosopher J.R. Searle summarizes deconstruction in his article“The World
Turned Upside Down”:“The deconstructionist wants to ... undermine logocentrism, ...
[so that] understanding [is] a form of misunderstanding, and that what we think of as
meaningful language is just a free play of signifiers or an endless process of grafting
texts onto texts”(171).  
As examples of attacks on attempts to question our certainty with regard to the
meaning of words, this pair of quotes, from the same decade but from unrelated
contexts, serve to illustrate the view of postmodern academic work as a pernicious
influence on public discourse.  The attention given to President Clinton’s unabashedly
nuanced language (which I think can possibly be disassociated from his being caught in
an outright lie about sex) and his lack of moral restraint in his married life coincided
with deconstruction’s having become a staple in the Humanities departments in
universities across the United States.  Consequently, the field of Humanities had (and
continues to) come under attack.  John R. Searle, for example, concludes his article on
deconstruction by stating that in“English Departments and other modern language
departments in American universities”deconstrution’s“very intellectual weaknesses
seem to be a source of popularity”(180).  These attacks on the Humanities and the
dearth of“objectivity”attributed to the Liberal Arts made their way out of the
academy to become a staple in the opinion pages of mainstream newspapers.  I wish I
still had the article, but I was very impressed with a syndicated op-ed piece published
in one of the Albuquerque (New Mexico) papers in which the writer compared the
“lack of rigor that has become acceptable in America’s Humanities departments”with
the grounded,“absolute”results to be attained in“business, science, and sport.”
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These allegations of“lack of rigor”and“moral relativism”have given rise to the
phenomenona of postmodernist theory (in general) and Jacques Derrida’s work (in
particular) being associated with many of our current social ills, from the President’s,
for some, liberal definition of truth and falsehood, to the nihilism that led to the
massacre in Columbine Colorado (which happened to come on the heels of the Clinton
impeachment debacle).  The most direct accusation of nihilism that I have found over
the course of this investigation is not unrelated to that massacre which purportedly
took place in celebration of Hitler’s birthday.  A footnote in Gayatri Spivak’s article
titled“Responsibility”states: 
Since many positions against deconstruction are based on hearsay, this [that
the phantom of subjectivity cannot be warded off] is the most common
accusation brought against it.  In the New York Times Book Review, for
example, Walter Reich casually remarks that the denial of the Holocaust owes
something to“a number of current assumptions, increasingly popular in
academia, regarding the indeterminacy of truth.”(27)
Spivak’s article was one of many I have found that address the ethical and
political issues surrounding Derrida’s work, and it is a fascinating exposition of
Derrida’s call to responsibility, followed by a demonstration of the place and need for a
deconstruction of“the violence of Reason itself, [which drives] the continually
differentiating textile of meanings into the shortest route to Truth” (54).  In fact,
Spivak’s paper, which begins with a discussion of Derrida’s paper Of Spirit: Heidegger
and the Question (1989), like most of the papers addressing the ethical dimensions of
deconstruction, bases its ideas on Derrida’s own responses to the accusations of the
moral indeterminacy of his project. 
The question remains however (at least in the mainstream media), whether
Derrida’s ideas --under the rubric of“postmodernism”-- are a cause of a moral
breakdown in society because they would rob us of any way“of distinguishing genuine
knowledge from its counterfeits”(Searle 179), or whether the freeing of language
“from the scientific and rationalistic encapsulations”(Coward 117) can indeed have“a
fundamental ethical impact on our human relationships”(107). 
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To begin the discussion, I would like to return briefly to the infamous massacre in
Colorado.  As I mentioned earlier, much of the discussion of this tragedy centered on
the lack of“values”in today’s society, and this lack is sometimes attributed to
“current assumptions ... regarding the indeterminacy of truth.”In contraposition, and
as a way to work towards Derrida’s ideas, I would like to cite a letter from a friend of
mine in Colorado who could not help but draw the opposite message from the tragedy.2
He writes:
I’ve found it very interesting to see how strong the [Christian]“born agains”
seem to be in [Littleton], and the notion here that these mass murderers had
kind of been possessed by or were in league with satanic forces.  I wonder if
their mental illness was not in some ways a reaction to what they felt was
inaccessible, namely power and respect within this community that was in
league with everything that is good.  After all, if they couldn’t fit in with the
community of the All-Good God, what was left to them in this polarity but
satanism.  It seems pretty clear to me how, in a sense, satanism can only exist
in the presence of the monotheistic religions.  The polytheistic religions do not
seem to have deities that are the absolute embodiment of evil.  It seems that
people who worship these extreme polarities like god-satan or war-peace, etc.
must be extremely unbalanced and very dangerous.  (Mark Schlaefer)3
I cite the passage at length because I want to emphasize the currency of the
question regarding the deconstruction or reconstruction of (in this case)“basic
Christian values”in our society.  One of the common ways to summarize Derrida’s
project is to say that“the deconstructionist is on the lookout for any of the traditional
binary oppositions in Western intellectual history,”[e.g. god-satan, peace-war] and
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had become a staple in U.S. academic life.  To my knowledge he has not read Derrida.
3 There is a certain correspondence here with Giovanna Borrasori’s comments on an aspect of Derrida’s thoughts on the
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alterity’［Faith and Knowledge Derrid]. Derrida sees the presence of the prefix‘re-’in both re-legere and re-ligare as
etymological evidence for his argument that religion in the Abrahamic defimition tende to resist true openness toward
the other”(155).
wants to“undermine these oppositions”(Searle 171).  As we go on to discuss some
ramifications of the skepticism involved in challenging these metaphysical categories, I
think it is worth emphasizing that, in spite of Derrida’s painfully abstract language in
his earlier work, the issues are part of an actual dialogue taking place in contemporary
American life.
In fact, part of the impetus behind this comparison and recapitulation of Cavell’s
and Derrida’s explorations of the issues of certainty stems from the change of regime
in the United States and some consequences of the current administration’s quest for
certainty.  On the one hand, President Bush’s religious and dichotomous rhetoric,
replete with now-famous phrases like“this is a battle of Good against Evil”and“You
are either with us or against us,”could almost serve as a caricature of the binary
oppositions to be undermined by deconstruction.  On the other hand, to use terms more
aligned with the work of Stanley Cavell, the ongoing tragedy of the U.S. invasion and
occupation of Iraq could be described as the inability to live with doubt; that is, the
jealous pursuit of certainty whose consequence is violence.  The United State’s
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, addressing the NATO ministers in Brussels
several months before the invasion of Iraq, laid out the case for war in these tragic
terms:
There are things that we know, and then there are known unknowns.  That is
to say, there are things that we now know that we don’t know.  But there are
also unknown unknowns.  There are things we do not know we don’t know. ...
That is, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. ... Simply because
you do not have evidence something exists does not mean that you have
evidence that is doesn’t exist.4
And as we all know, this absence of evidence of absence of the means to inflict
death on a mass scale, and the administration’s urgent desire for security, meant that
the conquest and violent physical search of Iraq was inevitable.  Cavell’s analysis is
certainly pertinent here, for he says in his introduction to Disowning Knowledge in Six
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Plays of Shakespeare that“tragedy is the working out of a response to skepticism”(5).
And in language that seems written to describe the philosophy behind the taking of
Iraq, Cavell goes on to say that:
“With his‘jealousy,’Othello’s violence studies the human use of knowledge
under the consequence of skepticism.  This violence in human knowing is, I
gather, what comes out of Heidegger’s perception that philosophy has, from
the beginning, but, if I understand, with increasing velocity in the age of
technology conceived of knowledge under the aegis of dominion, of the concept
of a concept as a matter, say, of grasping a thing. (9; emphasis added) 
Othello, however, after learning the error in his desire for certainty, repented,
although it was too late to undo the results of his violence; the spokesmen of dominion
in the U.S., in spite of what now could indeed be called the evidence of absence of
weapons of mass destruction, have shown no such willingness to acknowledge the
violence of their search for certainty as a tragic response to skepticism.  In
contraposition to this lack of acknowledgement, I am suggesting a reexamination of
ways to live with and learn from doubt.  The ideas of Derrida and Cavell, particularly
when examined side by side, may perhaps offer a treatment of the intuition that even
“the best case of knowledge shows itself vulnerable to suspicion”(Disowning
Knowledge 7). 
Keeping in mind Gayatri Spivak’s warning that,“Nothing but an intermediary
question can be posed and left suspended in the space of an essay”(58), I would like to
assert that an important feature of Derrida’s work is his insistence on“absence,”
which I want to align with Cavell’s use of“skepticism”regarding (particularly) the
knowledge of“other minds.”Both writers take this absence, or lack, as a call to
responsibility, or a call to respond, although in Derrida’s earlier work this call is
“somewhat masked by the initial emphasis ... on questions of epistemology and
metaphysics”(Kearny 31).
If we look at Derrida’s earlier writings, it is not difficult to find discussions of
absence, many of which lend themselves to the kind of sound bites that are used to
support the accusations that postmodernism is“a nihilism that is unconstrained by
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rules”(Wyschogrod xiii).  For example, in“Structure, Sign, and Play”Derrida says,
“The absence of a center is here the absence of a subject and the absence of an
author”(287).  Taken out of context, phrases like this are often used to riducule his
work, but what Derrida is discussing here is, simply, Levi-Strauss’s warning or
recognition that any society’s myths have no author or concrete subject; although
Derrida does go on to use this to make his point that the origins of language, and
consequently any totalizable meaning in language, is grounded on“play”and is
therefore“missing”(289).
The question of decentering the binary oppositions is also predicated on a kind of
absence.  The conclusion of Derrida’s“Signature, Event, Context”includes a relatively
succinct explanation of deconstruction which includes the phrase,“There is no
metaphysical concept in and of itself,”and it is here that we can glimpse an intimation
of what was later to be described as a (more or less) explicit ethical project:
Very schematically: an opposition of metaphysical concepts (for example,
speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two terms,
but a hierarchy and an order of subordination.  Deconstruction cannot limit
itself or proceed immediately to a neutralization: it must, by means of a double
gesture ... practice an overturning of the classical opposition and a general
displacement of the system.  It is only on this condition that deconstruction
will provide itself the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions
that it criticizes. (329)
Harold Coward, in his book Derrida and Indian Philosophy, attributes to this
overturning and displacement a fundamental ethical project because“For Derrida ...
the logocentric tradition of Western metaphysics ... is totalitarian because ... [it]
restrict[s] [language] to a particular one-sided structure of meaning”(106).  Spivak,
among others, would agree with Coward here, and many critics then go on to explore
how the absence of an absolute determinancy in truth or knowledge can be seen as
leading to“a call to respond”(Borradori, Coward, Gasche´ , Kearny, Spivak,
Wyschogrod, etc).
“Absence”in opposition to“presence,”is one of the binary  oppositions
prioritized for discussion. “Presence”has been analyzed as including the valorization
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of speech over writing.  This subordination of writing has been founded on the
assumption that if we face each other in speech, we must be present and
acknowledging each other, and thus, speech is where meaning is most fully present.
One of Derrida’s many moves to challenge this foundation of“presence”in speech is
elaborated in the essay“White Mythology”where (simplistically put) he problemitizes
any full presence of meaning in scientific discourse because it is impossible to weed out
(a metaphor) the use of metaphor in scientific or philosophical texts.  Derrida says,
“And what more urgent task for epistemology and for the critical history of the
sciences than to distinguish between the word, the metaphoric vehicle, the thing and
the concept?”(261).  Though, if I read the article correctly, Derrida concludes that this
urgent task is impossible.  Absolute meaning, even in the sciences, (or even when
speaking face to face) is impossible because metaphors are always standing in for
something which is absent.“This supplement of a code which traverses its own field,
endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no ontology will have
been able to reduce it”(271).
Even as various proponents of deconstruction have described the ethical call to
respond as a consequence of Derrida’s epistemological skepticism, I think it is
instructive to look at an American contemporary of Derrida’s use of skepticism.  As we
have noted, much of Cavell’s work parts from the“intuition ... that our fundamental
relation to the world is not one of knowing”(Philosophical Passages 49).  Which is not
to say exactly that Cavell is privileging skepticism, and he certainly isn’t accused of
nihilism the way Derrida has been.  Rather, much of Cavell’s work deals with
Wittgenstein’s philosophical therapy regarding skepticism.  In the article cited above
titled“What Did Derrida Want of Austin?”Cavell says,“On my view of Austin’s and
Wittgenstein’s work, they understand skepticism and metaphysics as forms of
intellectual tragedy”(61), and Cavell sets out to explore what can be garnered from
this tragedy.  Cavell warns us that much of the“tragedy”surrounding skepticism
comes from a desire for certainty.  In the essay on King Lear titled“The Avoidance of
Love”he states,“In the unbroken tradition of epistemology since Descartes and Locke
... the concept of knowledge ... becomes fixed to the concept of certainty alone”and this
certainty“is found to hang upon what can be said to be‘present’(emphasis added) to
the senses”(Disowning Knowledge 94).  And, continuing, in a phrase that sounds
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strikingly Derridian, Cavell says,“[the skeptic] finds that [the world] vanishes exactly
with the effort to make it present.”Or, to paraphrase, because we cannot always trust
our senses (or our language), the desire to confirm knowledge as certainty is futile and
leads to tragedy.5
How do we learn that what we need is not more knowledge but the
willingness to forgo knowing?  For this sounds to us as though we are being
asked to abandon reason for irrationality.... Whereas what skepticism suggests
is that since we cannot know the world exists, its presentness to us cannot be
a function of knowing.  The world is to be accepted, as the presentness of
other minds is not to be known, but acknowledged. (95)
This idea of acknowledgment is central to Cavell’s work, and could be said to be
the term which sums up his ethical project associated with the tragedy of skepticism.
In particular,“skepticism about other minds ... stands as exemplary of skepticism in
general”(Mulhall 11), and Cavell explores the issue of the problem of other minds in a
very clear analysis of the 1930s“Comedy of Remarriage”The Awful Truth. 
This film takes as its point of departure the moment when the couple -- Gerry and
Lucy -- find themselves confronted with their lack of knowledge about each other, and
this direct confrontation with unexpected possibilities breaks up their marriage.
Condensing Cavell’s essay almost out of existence, I would say that this couple’s first
direct confrontation with skeptical doubt is frightening, but as more and more
possibilities come to light, the characters are able to learn that marriage can be a
“festive existence”(Cavell Reader 175), and their marriage is saved.  Or, to return
briefly to Derrida,“We must conceive of a play in which whoever loses wins, and in
which one loses and wins on every turn”(“Diffe´rance”20).  Which is to say that,
according to Cavell’s exposition of this film, the couple wins by losing their certainty
regarding one another’s minds which returns the freedom of play (the positive side of
skepticism) to their marriage.
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In short, Cavell’s discussion of skepticism leads him to the conclusion that we can
use our lack of certainty to force us into an ethical posture of acknowledgment; that the
fundamental insight of the skeptic (regardless of what may be provable as true or false)
is that“certainty is not enough”(Cavell Reader 64).  He says,“It is not enough that I
know (am certain) that you suffer --I must do or reveal something (whatever can be
done).  In a word, I must acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what (‘your or his’)
being in pain means” (68).
In the context of married life and acknowledgment, it was instructive to read
Derrida’s discussion of the final Yes of Molly Bloom in Joyce’s Ulysses (“Ulysses
Gramophone”1987).“Ulysses Gramophone”is notoriously dense and circuitous, and
while Rodolphe Gasche´’s exposition on the ethical aspects of Derrida’s article in the
final chapters of his book Inventions of Difference is still incomparably dry and abstract
compared to Cavell’s writing on The Awful Truth, it is more accessible (indeed, it is
written as a clarification) than Derrida’s.  And Gasche´’s conclusions are strikingly
reminiscent of what I have tried to show Cavell as concluding:
Yes as a response to the call upon the Other to say yes to the speculative yes
of reconciliation is one such instance of undecidable infrastructural remaining
.... [Yet] Without the possibility of slippage, no response to the call to say yes to
yes is thinkable to begin with. (225)
I would paraphrase this passage as supporting the connection in Derrida’s thought
with Cavell’s regarding the necessity of doubt or play for responsible communication.
For example, when confronted with statements of Derrida’s like“there is no
experience of pure presence, but only chains of differential marks”(Margins 318) one
must ask oneself,“What is the epistemological point Derrida is making?”I think we
have been seeing the answer over the course of this study, which would be, in part at
least, that the Other is never purely knowable.  And to go back to the abstract
language of Gasche´ , we can see that Spivak (or Cavell) is not alone in drawing an
ethical conclusion from this absence of pure presence:
the relinquishing of the responsibility for control and mastery is testimony to a
desire to open writing [or marriage] to unforeseeable effects, in other words to
―　　―76
the Other.  It is a function of a responsibility for the Other --for managing in
writing a place for the Other, saying yes to the call or demand of the other,
inviting a response. (230)
Over the course of this investigation, it has been interesting to see the relative
consensus that various critics have come to regarding the ethical dimension of what I’m
calling Derrida’s skepticism or absence of certainty regarding the presence of other
minds.  For example, Derek Attridge writes in his introduction to Acts of Literature
that“there has always been an ethico-political dimension to Derrida’s writing,
manifesting itself particularly in a respect for otherness, ... Responsibility for Derrida is
not something we simply‘take’: we find ourselves summoned, confronted by an
undecidability which is also always an opportunity and a demand, a chance and a risk.”
(5).  At the same time Kearny, basing much of his essay on a published interview with
Derrida from 1982 (Deconstruction and the Other), states that:
deconstruction’s obsession with alterity is compatible with an ethics of
“increased responsibility.”Indeed, it might even be said that it serves as some
kind of philosophical condition for it.  For to safeguard the other from all
logocentric strategies to objectify and reify is to guard the other as an
irreducible locus of address and response--arguably the sine qua non of all
ethical discourse. (47) 
These examples of a taking up of the question of responding to alterity can be
elaborated through a brief discussion Gayatri Spivak’s article called“Responsibility.”
In the first part of this article, she discusses the impossibility of purely escaping
complicity with dangerous ideas or institutions.  This discussion is centered around
Derrida’s presentation on Heidegger.  She says,“deconstruction can not not
acknowledge complicity with Heidegger”(27).  The point being (to simplify almost
criminally), that even in the case of a man who was a Nazi, it would be irresponsible to
utilize the binary oppositions when regarding the relation of the man to his work or
deconstruction’s debt to him.  
The second half of the paper describes the Greens-organized conference in protest
to the World Bank’s“Flood Action Plan in Bangladesh.”In this section, which is a
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brilliant performance of the ineffable, infinite, problematic of responsibility in dealing
with the other (in this case the“subaltern”Bangladeshi spokesperson representing the
community that would be most directly affected by the diversion of the flood waters),
she describes the“complicity of the Green Party and the World Bank”(52), just as she
had reminded us of the complicity or contamination by Heidegger of academic
deconstruction.
Once again, I think the point is well taken that whatever we are attempting to do,
there is always a slippage whih subverts the oppositions, even when we consider
ourselves certain to be on the“good”side.  Spivak makes it very clear that this is not
to say that there is nothing good to be done.  She emphasizes that“Knowing that
responsibility in its setting-to-work can never reduce out the unilaterality of
subjectivity, we still compute how the form[s] of complicity ... are‘not equivalent’”
(52).  In the context of diffe´rance and the absence it implies, Derrida also insists that:
I will not conclude from this that there is no relative specificity of the effects
of consciousness, or the effects of speech (in opposition to writing in the
traditional sense), that there is no effect of the performative, no effect of
ordinary language, no effect of presence and of speech acts.  It is simply that
these effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to them term by term,
but on the contrary presuppose it in dyssemtrical fashion, as the general space
of their possibility. (Margins 327; emphasis added)   
I align Spivak’s and Derrida’words here to continue to refute the assertion that
deconstruction can be associated with a nihilism that may lead teenagers to commit
mass murder or justify a president’s lies.  On the contrary, this essay has intended to
show how there is a strong current of encouragement in both Cavell’s and Derrida’s
treatment of the issues of doubt and certainty (absence vs. presence).  Cavell warns us
that the world disappears exactly when we try to grasp it as certain.  Rather, it is
certainty that is totalitarian.  If we doubt that we can know completely, then according
to both Cavell and Derrida, it is more likely that we will respond responsibly to the call
of the other, who, whether as text or as human being must be acknowledged as a
partially absent presence.  There is always risk in this (in life); responding or
acknowledging the other is simply“a setting-to-work.”As Cavel reminds us in his
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treatment of King Lear,“What we do not now know is what there is to acknowledge,
what it is I am to make present, what I am to make myself present to”(Disowning
Knowledge 116).  Derrida, in his interview with Giovanna Borradori, insists that
democracy itself implies this same 
exposure to what comes or happens.  It is the exposure (the desire, the
openness, but also the fear) that opens, that opens itself, that opens us to time,
to what comes upon us, to what arrives or happens, to the event. (Philosophy
in a Time of Terror 120)  
Derrida’s view of the (impossible) project of democracy reads very much like
Cavell’s discussion of what he calls“The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage.”As
Mulhall puts it, these films chart a couple’s“capacity to overcome threats internal to
their marriage, ... and so depict marriage as constituted by a continuously renewed
willingness to remarry” (167).  More succinctly, Cavell says he takes“our films to be
proposing a comic Yes”(194); which, again, is part of Derrida’s discussion of the humor
in Ulysses.  Derrida insists that Joyce’s humor is not only farcical but also affirmative,
with Molly’s Yes serving as the virtuoso performance of this affirmation.  He describes
this affirmation“as the yes-laughter of a gift without debt, light affirmation, ... that
reveals and names the cycle of reappropriation and domestication ... in order to contrive
the breach necessary for the coming of the other (Acts of Literature 295).  We see then
that these philosophers are offering a perspective from which to regain the“festive”
or the“play”in the face of what we can never completely know.  Living in doubt, as
Stanley Cavell might say, is to choose to turn from tragedy to comedy.
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